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INTRODUCTION
As broadband becomes the public's technology of choice to access
the Internet, it is also emerging as the battlefield upon which the struggle
for control of the Internet is being fought.' Operators who provide physi-
cal access to the service claim the right to discriminate among the
content providers who use the infrastructure in which the operators have
invested.2 In contrast, content providers warn that exercising such a pol-
icy would "undermine the principles that have made the Internet such a
success."3 This is what has become known popularly and academically as
the "network neutrality" battle. Some observers, most notably a former
chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), have de-
fined it as a "battle between the extremely wealthy ... and the merely
rich."4 Members of Congress have already proposed legal means, often
contradictory, for addressing it,5 and presidential candidates have made
their opinions heard as well.6 For academic observers, analysis of this
7.
issue has thus far been confined to the areas of property law, innova-• 8
tion, and competition models.9
This study, however, offers a different framework for analyzing the
"network neutrality" controversy, one that takes into account that the
1. See Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, Federal Communications
Commission Releases Data On High-Speed Services For Internet Access (Jan. 31, 2007),
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-270135A1 .pdf.
2. Spencer E. Ante & Roger 0. Crockett, Rewired and Ready For Combat, BUSINESS
WEEK, Nov. 7, 2005, at 110, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/
05_45/b3958089.htm?chan=search.
3. Network Neutrality: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 109th Cong. 1 (2006) (statement of Vinton G. Cerf, Vice President and Chief
Internet Evangelist, Google Inc.) (emphasis omitted), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/
pdf/cerf-020706.pdf.
4. William E. Kennard, Op-Ed., Spreading the Broadband Revolution, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 21, 2006, at A13.
5. See Internet Freedom Preservation Act, S. 2917, 109th Cong. (2006); Tom Abate,
Net Neutrality Amendment Dies: Telecommunications Bill Goes to Senate Without
Provision Sought By Web Firms, S.F. CHRON., June 29, 2006, at C1, available at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgif=/c/a/2006/06/29/NET.T; David Hatch, Sens.
Dorgan, Snowe, Revive 'Network Neutrality' Push, NAT'L J., Jan. 10, 2007,
available at http://www.njtelecomupdate.comlenya/telco/live/tb-LNQZ1168461010680.html;
Todd Hearne, Dorgan, Snowe Introduce Net-Neutrality Bill, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Jan. 9,
2007, available at http://www.multichannel.com/article/CA6405766.html.
6. See Charles Babington, Neutrality On the Net Gets High '08 Profile, WASH. POST,
Feb. 20, 2007, at DOI.
7. Brett M. Frishmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, (Am. Law & Econ. Ass'n An-
nual Meetings, Working Paper No. 27, 2006), available at http://law.bepress.coml
alea/I 6th/art27.
8. Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2005).
9. Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH 1 (2005).
Network Neutrality & John Rawls's Theory of Justice
Internet is a new medium of "mass self communication."' The Internet
provides a unique venue for civic engagement, exposure to information,
and opportunity for education. The established frameworks that guide
the regulation of traditional media are not necessarily suitable for this
new form of communication because they fail to address its multi-
participant character (as opposed to the limited-participant technologies
of "old media"), and the abundance created by its innovative technologi-
cal form (as opposed to the scarcity which characterized "old media").
Here arises the urgent need to address this debate in its appropriate con-
text. While others have framed the debate in terms of another battle
among the conflicting interests of large corporations, we view it as a
struggle between the newly defined classes of haves and have-nots. We
contend that using this new frame of reference should provide both those
whose interests have been ignored by the regulation of past technologies,
and the newly created have-nots, with an opportunity to better their so-
cial positioning by enjoying unobstructed access to the Internet as users.
Therefore, we propose abandoning the utilitarian philosophy that has
characterized U.S. telecommunications regulation-the outcome of
which has been promoting the interests of a fortunate few-and adopting
the alternative theory of John Rawls's "theory of justice.""
As Ithiel de Sola Pool noted in his seminal Technologies of Freedom,2
the regulation of media technologies in the United States has been defined
by technological constraints. While the governing principle of speech and
printed press regulation (or lack thereof) has been the First Amendment,
common carriage and broadcasting developed under vastly different regu-
latory theories because of their technological attributes. Pool explained the
difference between those two types of regulation by noting that "freedom
is fostered when the means of communication are dispersed, decentral-
ized, and easily available, as are printing presses or microcomputers.
Central control is more likely when the means of communication are con-
centrated, monopolized, and scarce, as are great networks . ,, " Pool was
concerned that although the transition to electronic communications
10. Manuel Castells, Communication, Power and Counter-power in the Network Soci-
ety, 1 INT'L J. CoMm. 238, 239 (2006).
11. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. 1971)
[hereinafter Theory]; JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (Columbia Univ. Press 1993)
[hereinafter Political Liberalism]; JOHN RAWLS, COLLECTED PAPERS (Samuel Freeman ed.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1999) [hereinafter Collected Papers]; JOHN RAWLS, The Basic Liberties
and Their Priority, in LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND LAW: SELECTED TANNER LECTURES ON
MORAL PHILOSOPHY 1 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., Univ. of Utah Press 1987) [hereinafter
Basic Liberties]; JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (Erin Kelly ed., The
Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. 2001) [hereinafter Restatement].
12. ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (The Belknap Press of Harvard
Univ. 1983).
13. ld. at5.
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meant more of the media of the first type, legacy regulatory frameworks
were being applied to these means of communication because of gov-
ernments' knee-jerk tendency to regulate and treat them as media of the
second kind, even though this was no longer required. 4 One could argue
that regulation of the Internet, the most decentralized of technologies,
was consequently not justified.
What Pool's analysis does not identify, however, is that although the
reasons articulated for the regulation of both legacy networks, broadcast-
ing and common carriage were different, they in fact invoke a similar
model. Two levels of scarcity can be identified in each of the technolo-
gies that provide communication services: a "physical/technological
scarcity," determined by either technological or economic constraints,
and a "content scarcity," either in the number of conduits for content or
in the diversity of content within those conduits. The question regarding
whether or not regulation is required must first be answered by proper
identification of the locale of either "scarcity" or "abundance." Scarcity
of broadcasters is an outcome of physical constraints 5 while scarcity of
common carriers is more of an economic ploy,'6 but in both cases the
regulatory solution requires the regulator to prefer the interests of one
actor over the interests'7 of another. Under such a regime, a private actor
regulates the actions of another actor over a licensed network that suffers
from internal, or "content," scarcity. Common carrier licenses limited the
right of competitors who wished to provide the same service, while
broadcast regulation awarded a license to one at the expense of another's
right to free speech. Cable regulation (which was in its infancy when
Pool wrote his book in the early 1980s) is a somewhat hybrid case that
created a "natural monopoly" (an economic rather than a technological
monopoly). A cable company enjoys the status of monopoly provider of
a service and eventually is awarded that of a "speaker" who silences oth-
ers. In all these cases, regulators believed that a greater common good
would be reached, as they are charged with securing and protecting "the
public interest, necessity, and convenience. '' "s This "choice-making"
among commercial entities and among members of the public, in gen-
eral, invokes the utilitarian model. The common result of utilitarian
14. Id.
15. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
16. For a description of how elimination of competition and refusal of licenses in the
1920s were orchestrated in the name of a more efficient telephone service, see RICHARD H. K.
VIETOR, CONTRIVED COMPETITION, REGULATION AND DEREGULATION IN AMERICA 167-85
(The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. 1994); Adam D. Thierer, Unnatural Monopoly: Critical
Moments in the Development of the Bell System Monopoly, 2 CATO J. 267, 273-74 (1994).
17. The term "interest" is being used here very carefully, as will be explained further
on, to differentiate it from the term "right."
18. 47 U.S.C. § 214 (2007); 47 U.S.C. § 310 (2007); 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2007).
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solutions was that those awarded the license over the scarce physi-
cal/economic infrastructure gained an advantage regarding the content
traveling over it. This advantage was meaningful because content was
scarce. However, while physical scarcity remains for broadband Internet,
content scarcity does not. The question we raise and answer, therefore, is
whether the underlying assumption that interests gained in the physical
infrastructure under conditions of scarcity should continue to translate
into a right to regulate content under the guise of scarcity, or whether the
introduction of abundance in the content layer allows rethinking the un-
derlying theory of utilitarianism that has guided telecommunications
regulators since the beginning.
Following this introduction, Section II reviews two competing theo-
ries of justice-utilitarianism and Rawlsian distributive justice-and
their general relevance to communication policymaking. Although it
embraces capitalism and the role of markets in fair regulation, Rawls's
theory nonetheless offers a methodology for ensuring basic freedoms
and rights while correcting the ills of the past before adopting new poli-
cies. Traditional utilitarianism lacks this methodology. Section III
describes three historical narratives of policy development that informed
the choice of policies regulating access and content of the Internet: the
regulation of broadcasting, common carriage, and cable television. Sec-
tion III further demonstrates that these policy choices assumed scarcity
at a "physical/technological" level and at a "content level," which led to
the design of policy as a utilitarian solution: maximization of the total
common good at the expense of individual members of society on both
levels. The policies that developed in the "old media" awarded a few the
right to provide services based on assumptions of scarcity, and, as a re-
sult, provided these players with an advantage in the dissemination of
content over the networks they built, which themselves suffered from
content scarcity. Section IV describes the unique role of the Internet in
both mass communications and multimodal personal communication,
and explains why ensuring unobstructed egalitarian access to its content
requires a different theoretical framework. Section V explains that legacy
regulation threatens freedom on the Internet because traditional First
Amendment interpretation is limited to bi-modal scenarios; the current
regulatory framework leaves those who control access to the Internet
unregulated; and the courts have termed the right of carriage of signals
awarded due to "physical scarcity" equivalent to a First Amendment
speech right. Section VI demonstrates how Rawls's theory of justice bet-
ter fits the Internet and better serves the public interest. This provides a
theoretical justification for our conclusion that awarding the owners of
the still-scarce physical network the right to discriminate among users of
Fall 20071
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the content-abundant network, when they acquired this right under con-
ditions of scarcity of content that no longer exist, perpetuates a distortion
of power that cannot be justified.
The materialization of the promise of the Internet requires its main-
tenance as an open and neutral network. We are therefore concerned
about the continued reliance on legacy policies and intend to offer here a
new underlying theory for regulation of access to the Internet. We sug-
gest that although Rawls's theory preceded the popularization of the
Internet by decades, it has the power to bridge the different policy narra-
tives and offer a framework for maintaining the free nature of the
Internet because it addresses both the social and economic nature of the
Internet policy debate, accepts the general framework of market econ-
omy and capitalism, focuses on protecting fundamental rights, and
proposes an egalitarian, fair, and just solution.
I. COMPETING THEORIES OF JUSTICE
A. Utilitarianism
Utilitarian solutions in this study are defined as solutions that con-
form to the principles of utility developed by the eighteenth century
philosopher Jeremy Bentham and later explicated by his disciple John
Stuart Mill and others. According to Bentham, "[a] measure of govern-
ment... may be said to be conformable to or dictated by the principle of
utility, when in like manner the tendency which it has to augment the
happiness of the community is greater than any which it has to diminish
it."' 9 And as Mill further explicated: "[H]appiness which forms the utili-
tarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own
happiness, but that of all concerned., 20 However, "the equal claim of eve-
rybody to happiness in the estimation of the moralist and the legislator,
involves an equal claim to all the means of happiness, except in so far as
the inevitable conditions of human life, and the general interest, in which
that of every individual is included, set limits to the maxim; and those
limits ought to be strictly construed."'"
Utilitarian solutions conform to three main principles that, as will be
later discussed, are strikingly different from the Rawlsian approach ad-
vocated in this paper. First, they are goal-oriented rather than rights-
based. Second, they are focused on maximizing the size of the economic
19. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGIS-
LATION 13 (Clarendon Press 1995).
20. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 15 (Alex Catalogue of Electronic Texts) (1863),
available at http://infomotions.cometexts/philosophy/1800-1899/mill-utilitarianism-218.htm.
21. Id. at 52.
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cake rather than on the way the cake is distributed. Third, they may jus-
tify, perhaps even require, favoring the few at the expense of the many in
the name of the "common good."
In addition, utilitarian philosophy has provided the basis for adopt-
ing the idea of freedom of expression into U.S. jurisprudence. The root
of the concept of the "marketplace of ideas" can be traced back to Mill's
philosophy,2  as can the concept of social responsibility of the press,
23
which evolved out of recognition of the dangers of concentration of the
ownership of the press in the hands of a few. 4 Such concerns have been
seen as the precursor to the theory of access to the press, 5 a theory
which in fact questions whether the "marketplace of ideas" can function
without a "legal imposition of legal responsibilities.2 6 Utilitarian theory
has been used to justify regulation under scarcity because it justifies si-
lencing voices for the sake of the common good under conditions of
scarcity and conditions that require making choices, and used to critique
27
the fact that utilitarian solutions do not fix past distortions .
The commonalities in the regulatory frameworks of the broadcast li-
censing, common carriage, and cable technology industries emerge from
the use of utilitarianism to address the scarcity technological constraints
create. The broadcasting licensing scheme chooses among competing
requests for provision of service based on the content obligations of the
licensees. Regulation of common carriage was based until 1996 on a
similar assumption. The scarcity on the physical/technological level was
dictated by economic assumptions as was the regulation of "content." A
similar process exists in cable technology. Although there is little explicit
acknowledgement of cable's natural monopoly of physical/technological
scarcity, current cable regulation nonetheless accounts for this fact. As
was the case in broadcasting and common carriage, lawmakers, regula-
tors, and eventually, the courts, realized that physical/technological
scarcity requires intervention to develop and protect diversity within the
cable content offering. The intervention chosen, however, has elevated
the "rights" of the network owners to speech rights and ensured the
22. ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD, 191 (Oxford University
Press 1999).
23. Adam S. Plotkin, The First Amendment and Democracy: The Challenge of New
Technology, 11(4) J. MASS MEDIA ETHICS 236, 239-40 (1996).
24. THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS: A
GENERAL REPORT ON MASS COMMUNICATIONS (University of Chicago Press 1947).
25. Jerome Barron, Access to the Press-a New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1641 (1967).
26. Id. at 1674.
27. By past distortions we mean the existing relations of power, created by the limited
number of corporations controlling the broadcasting spectrum, common carriage, and cable
television. These relations of power have extended commercial entities' physical control over
networks to include content control as well.
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retransmission of channels that already enjoy preference in the scarce
spectrum at the expense of an undefined number of others.2 s The utilitar-
ian conception of justice informs each of these regulatory models.
B. Rawls's Theory of Distributive Justice
The theory of justice developed by John Rawls, one of the most in-
fluential Anglo-American political philosophers of the twentieth
century,29 has been described as the "most influential of all twentieth
century theories of justice."' Rawls's theory of justice3 regulates the
procedures under which a society determines the rules that pertain to
what he calls the basic structure of society, 2 which are its fundamental
institutions, such as the law and the economy. Rawls assumes that these
"first principles of a conception of justice,"33 the principles that are to
regulate all further agreements,34 should create the conditions for all de-
cisions to be reached in a rational manner.3" To arrive at a rational
discussion, the participants in the discussion must participate unaware of
their own circumstances and how they themselves will fare as a result of
the decision reached. This hypothetical situation, which Rawls refers to
as "the original position, 3 6 is reached under a "veil of ignorance."37
The principles derived from the original position aim to arrange so-
cial institutions, such as markets, into a "scheme of cooperation."38 There
28. Notably, in Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (Turner 1) (1997), the
Supreme Court accepted as fact that content scarcity had little or no effect on cable operators
or programmers:
94.5 percent of the cable systems nationwide have not had to drop any program-
ming; the remaining 5.5 percent have had to drop an average of only 1.22 services
from their programming; operators nationwide carry 99.8 percent of the program-
ming they carried before must-carry; and broadcast stations gained carriage on only
5,880 cable channels as a result of must-carry. The burden imposed by must-carry is
congruent to the benefits it affords because, as appellants concede, most of those
5,880 stations would be dropped in its absence. Must-carry therefore is narrowly
tailored to preserve a multiplicity of broadcast stations for the 40 percent of Ameri-
can households without cable.
Id. at 182. However, this does not change the fact that the problem was scarcity, and the solu-
tion that was offered was utilitarian.
29. John S. Dryzek & Christian List, Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democ-
racy: A Reconciliation 33 B.J. POL. S. 1 (2003).
30. SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 9 (Basic Books 1989).
31. See generally RAwLs, supra note 11.
32. RAwLS, Theory, supra note 11, at 7.
33. Id. at 13.
34. Id. at 11.
35. Id. at 13.
36. Id. at 17.
37. Id. at 17-22.
38. Id. at 54-55.
Network Neutrality & John Rawls's Theory of Justice
are two principles: (1) that the basic liberties of each person, including
freedom of speech, which falls under the basic liberty of freedom,
should be guaranteed; 9 and (2) that existing social and economic ine-
qualities should be arranged so that they benefit all,0 particularly
providing the greatest advantage to the least advantaged members of so-
ciety.4' The idea is that the fortunes of the better off should not be
established and secured unless it also advantages the least fortunate.42
The least fortunate are defined, in a cyclical way, through the identi-
fication of "primary goods,'4 3 things that free and equal citizens need in
order to cooperate fully as members of society (as well as pursue their
own conceptions of the good). First on the list are the basic rights and
liberties, 4 defined as those rights which allow citizens to make use of
their basic moral powers, primarily the capacity for a sense of justice.45
However, it does not follow from a guarantee of the basic liberties
that they cannot be regulated. 6 Indeed, regulation may be required in
order to turn freedom of "speech" into freedom of "discussion," '7 be-
cause the ultimate goal of maintaining basic liberties is to allow
members of society to participate in the decision-making process itself.
The need for discussion illustrates the unique standing of basic rights:
because every egalitarian expansion comes at the expense of others, and
of the conversation itself, by ensuring that everyone possesses some
rights, the rights become self-limiting.4' Because the choice is made from
a position of ignorance, the principles must benefit all free and equal
persons in a well-ordered society. Basic freedoms, and the priority they
demand, are fundamental to such persons with a sense of justice and the
capacity to pursue their own good.
Thus, rules of discussion become necessary. However, based on the
same principles and Rawls's notion that "liberty may only be limited for
the sake of liberty and not for the sake of other social and economic ad-
vantages," 49 rules of discussion can only be created by the participants
themselves. Further, these rules can only be considered if all partici-
pants, particularly the least advantaged, have bettered their position in
39. Id. at 6 -61.
40. Id. at 60.
41. See RAWLS, Collected Papers, supra note 11, at 392.
42. RAWLS, Theory, supra note 11, at 75.
43. RAWLS, Restatement, supra note 11, at 58.
44. See id. (listing the primary goods).
45. Id. at 18.
46. Id. at 111.
47. RAWLS, Basic Liberties, supra note 11, at 9-10.
48. RAWLS, Political Liberalism, supra note 11, at 341.
49. H.L.A. Hart, Rawls on Liberty and its Priority 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 534, 534 (1973).
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the end.5° Consequently, certain regulations may be legitimately enacted
on private property that in itself is not necessary for a sufficient articula-
tion of the basic rights (controlling natural resources, rights of
acquisition and the right for inheritance);5' however, the denial of equal
political liberties (and not privileged ones) cannot be based on the fact
that their existence may enable them to block "policies needed for eco-
nomic efficiency and growth." 2 Rawls's theory targets individual
liberties. Distortions in the power structure that are rooted in the past,
however, need to be corrected before implementing the free market rules,
so that those who currently are the least fortunate can improve their posi-
tion.
Rawls's theory of justice offers an alternative to traditional utilitarian
thought53 that has historically been at the core of free speech theory.
Classic utilitarianism aims to maximize the total social good at the ex-
pense of individuals, while Rawls's theory of distributive justice adopts
the maximin rule, which establishes that inequalities in income and
wealth that might result from a strategy of efficiency or maximization
are permissible only if they maximally benefit the least advantaged 4 As
a result, a society is created that is "rightly ordered, and therefore just,
when its major institutions are arranged so as to achieve the greatest net
balance of satisfaction summed over all the individuals belonging to it."55
II. HISTORICAL NARRATIVES
A. Broadcasting
The first communication technology to be explicitly regulated under
the presumption of physical scarcity was the electromagnetic spectrum.
Most historic accounts characterize it as a chaotic spectrum that required
a guiding hand. However, such accounts fail to recognize that broadcast-
ing actually emerged as a medium for hobbyists and entrepreneurs who
discovered its potential as a means of communication. 6 The corporate
establishment only displaced them once it realized broadcasting had
publicity and advertising potential 7 The laws and regulations which
50. RAWLS, Theory, supra note I1, at 302
51. RAWLS, Restatement, supra note 11, at 114.
52. RAWLS, Basic Liberties, supra note 11, at 8-9.
53. See, e.g., Michael R. Gardner, Rawls on the Maximin Rule and Distributive Justice,
27 PHIL. STUD. 255, 255 (1975).
54. See RAWLS, Theory, supra note 11, at 154 (explaining the maximin rule).
55. Id. at 22.
56. THOMAS STREETER, SELLING THE AIR: A CRITIQUE OF THE POLICY OF COMMER-
CIAL BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES 61 (University of Chicago Press 1996).
57. Id.
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eventually evolved turned broadcasting into a "linchpin of the consumer
economy," marginalizing all of its other potential uses. 8 Radio, for ex-
ample, was portrayed in the popular media as a medium so complex that
only large and powerful corporations could put it to the right use. 9 This
"use" meant realizing its potential as a unifying force, capable of con-
necting the atomized communities of America into one community that
shares "thoughts, ideals and purposes." 6 The legal framework designed
to serve the development of this big promise culminated in the Radio Act
of 192761 and the Communications Act of 1934.62 In both these acts, the
criterion set for awarding licenses for use of the spectrum was the licen-
see's presumed service to the "public interest, convenience and
necessity,, 63 a phrase selected for lack of a better idea.6
Having received a general and rather obscure mandate, the Federal
Radio Commission (FRC), formed by the 1927 Radio Act, soon began
providing its own statutory interpretations. Aspiring broadcasters who
were more interested in the dissemination of political, religious, social,
or economic viewpoints were shunned, and clear preference was given to
broadcasters who offered programming with broad entertaining appeal.
Because it was not possible to award every opinion a place in the spec-
trum, the FRC opted to leave them all out.65 This prompted the
establishment of national radio networks, whose market share grew from
six percent to thirty percent between 1927 and 1931.66 When the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) believed that these networks were
reverting to non-competitive practices that endangered the efficient use
of the airwaves, the FCC, created by the 1934 Act, sought to limit their
power and gained the backing of the United States Supreme Court in its
quest. 67 In supporting the FCC's actions, the Court explained that "the
facilities of radio are not large enough to accommodate all who wish to
use them. Methods must be devised for choosing from among the many
58. Id.
59. SUSAN J. DOUGLAS, INVENTING AMERICAN BROADCASTING, 1899-1922 304 (Johns
Hopkins University Press 1987).
60. Id. at 306 (quoting Stanley Frost, Radio Dreams That Can Come True, COLLIER'S,
June 10, 1922, at 18).
61. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 81-83 (repealed 1934).
62. Pub. L. No. 416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
63. See Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The "Public Interest" Standard: The
Search for the Holy Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605, 608-13 (1998) (giving a history of the
public interest standard).
64. Id. at 610.
65. ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND DEMOCRACY
27 (Oxford Univ. Press 1993).
66. Id. at 29.
67. Nat'l Broad. Co. v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943).
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who apply., 68 The Court further explained that "[t]he avowed aim of the
Communications Act of 1934 was to secure the maximum benefits of
radio to all the people of the United States."69 Thus, in the National
Broadcasting Co. decision, the Court both established scarcity as the
motivation for regulation and accepted that under these conditions the
best solution in "the public interest" is maximizing the benefits of radio
to all citizens. In this way, scarcity led to a utilitarian solution which ac-
cepts preferring one applicant over another and leaves the latter applicant
without an independent outlet. Indeed, as the Court stipulated:
The question here is simply whether the Commission, by an-
nouncing that it will refuse licenses to persons who engage in
specified network practices (a .basis for choice which we hold is
comprehended within the statutory criterion of "public inter-
est"), is thereby denying such persons the constitutional right of
free speech. The right of free speech does not include, however,
the right to use the facilities of radio without a license.... De-
nial of a station license on that ground, if valid under the Act, is
not a denial of free speech.70
The connection between regulation of scarcity and free speech was
challenged yet again in the 1969 case of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC.7' In this case, the Court upheld the now defunct "fairness doctrine"
and reiterated the connection between free speech and scarcity. In doing
so, the Court invoked the rights of the public at large, and in particular,
First Amendment rights.72 While the Court repeated its assertion that a
connection exists between the First Amendment and broadcasting, it
added that the government may choose to restrain licensees "in favor of
others whose views should be expressed on this unique medium., 73 The
Court stated that it is the people, as a whole, who have a collective right
to free speech that supersedes that of broadcasters.7 4 "There is nothing in
the First Amendment," explained the Court, "which prevents the Gov-
ernment from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with
others... ,,7' The "fairness doctrine," which served as the justification
and impetus for the Red Lion ruling, was eventually scrapped," and the
general public's speech was again forfeited in the name of the greater
68. Id.
69. Id. at 217.
70. Id. at 226-27.
71. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
72. Id. at 375.
73. Id. at 390.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 389.
76. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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public good. Later the Court reverted to the position that no individual
had a "general right of access to the media,' 7 7 and took a step further by
stating that treading "unnecessarily on the editorial discretion of broad-
casters contravene[s] the First Amendment."78 The exclusive license
awarded to broadcasters to address physical scarcity was protected under
the First Amendment.
The fairness doctrine was deemed obsolete for several reasons, two
of which are relevant to this study. First, the Court found that the public
had access to enough viewpoints as a consumer. Second, the Court
agreed with the FCC that scarcity was no longer an issue because "the
communications market as a whole provides 'reasonable assurance' of
public access to viewpoint diversity,' 79 citing the advent of cable televi-
sion and the existence of channels such as CNN and C-SPAN. ° With the
"elimination" of physical scarcity, the need to encroach on the rights of
licensees to satisfy unidentified right-less "speakers" had disappeared.
B. Common Carriage
The regulation of common carriage has developed through the ac-
knowledgement of a de facto scarcity. This may have been reluctant and
unplanned, but ever since Theodore Vail's 1907 assertion that "universal
service" should be provided by one system,8' the Willis-Graham Act of
1921 that recognized telephony as a natural monopoly to be regulated as
a utility,82 and the consent decree of 1984 that established the Regional
Bell Operating Companies as monopolies of local service,83 there has
been no doubt that common carriage was designed as a service provided
by a monopoly. The provision of a service by a monopoly creates an
immediate "physical" scarcity, which may require regulation of the
"content" scarcity. The effect of the physical scarcity on the content
scarcity within telephone networks of common carriage has been dealt
with, just as in broadcasting, in a utilitarian fashion. The process has be-
come known as the "computer inquiries."
77. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1979).
78. Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d at 684.
79. Id. at 685.
80. Id. ("For example, one well-known cable channel, whose chief anchor is blessed
with the name of Bernard Shaw, is devoted solely to news; two cable channels are given over
to coverage of Congress and related issues.").
81. See Milton Mueller, Myth Made Law (Telecommunications Act of 1996), COMM. OF
THE ACM, March 1997, at 39.
82. See generally Stuart Daggett, Telephone Consolidation Under the Act of 1921, 7 J.
LAND & PUB. UTIL. EcON. 22 (1931).
83. U.S. v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 222-27 (D.D.C. 1982).
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The first "computer inquiry" was launched in 19664 and ruled on in
1971." It was instigated by the growth of data processing services over
telephone lines and resulted in a ban on the participation of AT&T,
which was at the time an all-encompassing telephone monopoly, in the
provision of data services.86 The second "computer inquiry," launched in
197687 and resolved in 1981,88 however, allowed AT&T to provide data
services (that by now had been renamed "enhanced services"), but only
through a separate subsidiary to prevent discrimination against providers
of competing services. In 1986, when the FCC launched the third com-
puter inquiry, 9 it proposed eliminating the requirement for structural
separation 9° and replacing it with an open network architecture (ONA)
requirement that would allow all providers of enhanced services equal
access to the components of the monopoly telephone network. 9' This
proposal encountered fierce legal challenges, 92 however, that were not
resolved by the time the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which
adopted a new regulatory regime that introduced competition in local
telephony, was passed. The deregulatory spirit of the computer inquiries
was embraced by the law. What had been recognized as monopoly ser-
vices requiring regulation as common carriage were renamed
"telecommunication services," and what had been identified in the "old
order" as "enhanced services," to be mostly de- or non-regulated, were
renamed "information services." Once again, the process of gradually
providing the fortunate with control acquired due to "physical scarcity"
over the "content scarcity" repeated itself: a prohibition to provide "con-
tent" services; a requirement to provide them through a separate
84. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer
and Communication Service and Facilities, 7 F.C.C.2d 11 (1966) (notice of inquiry).
85. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer
and Communication Services and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971) (final decision and or-
der).
86. See generally Jason Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulation of the Internet (FCC
Office of Plans and Policy, Working Paper No. 31, 1999); Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the
Federal Communications Commission's Computer Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167 (2003).
87. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, 61
F.C.C.2d 103 (1976) (notice of inquiry and proposed rulemaking).
88. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second
Computer Inquiry), 88 EC.C.2d 512 (1981) (memorandum opinion and order on further re-
consideration).
89. Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third
Computer Inquiry), 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) (report and order).
90. Id. at 964.
91. By then, AT&T was not the provider of local access following the consent decree
issued in U.S. v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 222-27 (D.D.C. 1982), but rather the Regional Bell
Operating Companies (RBOCs).
92. E.g., California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994).
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subsidiary; and the unregulated sharing of the network structure with
competitors in the provision of "content" services.
C. Cable
Cable services are a hybrid of broadcasting and telephony, at least
technologically. Indeed, it is rather ironic that the diversity promised by
the advent of cable television was among the justifications for "liberat-
ing" broadcasters from the "constraints" of the fairness doctrine, for as
soon as the potential of this service was realized, so was its potential ca-
pability for encroaching on a field dominated by broadcasters. Cable
television has been identified as "another instance in a longstanding tra-
dition of blind optimism in technologies to bring about social change."93
Like broadcasting, it initially held great promise for promoting diversity
of voices and a "communication revolution. 94 But cable is also a tech-
nology of both "physical" and "content" scarcity. Therefore, in 1972, the
FCC launched a full-fledged assault on cable television, fearing its nega-
tive impact on broadcasters. 95 The rules it enacted then were gradually
perceived as obsolete, and by the end of the decade, they had all but dis-
appeared.96 However, most of these rules, in particular those imposing
limitations on cable operators in order to protect broadcasters, were not
scrapped because they were seen as an imposition on cable operators'
First Amendment rights. In fact the Supreme Court ruled that the FCC
had the authority to regulate cable television even before such authority
was granted through legislation.97 The FCC's authority included proac-
tive requirements for production and dissemination of content that the
FCC found to be in the public interest.98 Citing the 1943 National Broad-
casting Co. decision, 99 which dealt with broadcasting, and applying it to
cable, the Court stated:
The effect of the regulation, after all, is to assure that in the re-
transmission of broadcast signals viewers are provided suitably
diversified programming-the same objective underlying regula-
tions sustained in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States
93. Patricia Aufderheide, Cable Television and the Public Interest, 42 J. COMM. 52, 55
(1992).
94. SLOAN COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, ON THE CABLE: THE TELEVI-
SION OF ABUNDANCE 2 (McGraw Hill 1971).
95. See Stanley M. Besen & Robert W. Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable Television,
44 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 97 (1981).
96. ROBERT W. CRANDALL & HAROLD FURCHTGOTT-ROTH, CABLE TV: REGULATION
OR COMPETITION? 5 (R.R. Donnelley and Sons, Co. 1996).
97. U.S. v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
98. U.S. v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 662-71 (1972).
99. See Nat'l Broad. Co. v. U.S., supra note 67.
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.... In essence the regulation is no different from Commission
rules governing the technological quality of CATV broadcast
carriage. In the one case, of course, the concern is with the
strength of the picture and voice received by the subscriber,
while in the other it is with the content of the programming of-
fered. But in both cases the rules serve the policies ... of the
Communications Act on which the cablecasting regulation is
specifically premised.' °°
Unlike broadcasting, the regulation of cable began with few First
Amendment concerns because of the government's intervention in pro-
gramming content.'°' The government's requirement that cable television
maintain a minimum of original programming was perceived as a means
of ensuring that cable service "satisfactorily meets community needs
within the context of their undertaking.'
0 2
"Must-carry" rules that required carriage of local signals that gener-
ated an interest for third parties were not challenged in court initially.' 3
Only in the 1980s were "must-carry" rules found unconstitutional' ° by a
court of appeals because of its incidental burden on cable operators'
speech. "Must-carry" rules only gained the "constitutional" stamp of the
Supreme Court after they became part of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992.' °- However, the Supreme Court
first granted the distribution of cablecasts over the cable network its own
stamp of approval by recognizing it as speech. ' 6 In Turner 107 the Court
stated outright that "cable programmers and cable operators engage in
and transmit speech and they are entitled to the protection of the speech
and press provisions of the First Amendment."'0 8 Later, in a second case,
four of the Justices on the Supreme Court justified their finding that the
"must-carry" rules are constitutional by citing the furtherance of the
government's interest in promoting fair competition by protecting local
broadcasting's economic health, by preserving the benefits of free, over-
the-air local broadcast television, and by promoting the widespread dis-
100. Midwest Video, 406 U.S. at 669.
101. See, e.g., id. at 709 n.19 (while declining to reach the question posed in the lower
court of whether the "Commission's rules might violate the First Amendment rights of cable
operators" and, instead, basing its decision on "statutory grounds," the Court still acknowl-
edged that such a question was "not frivolous").
102. Id. at 670.
103. Besen & Crandall, supra note 95.
104. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1452, 1462-63 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
105. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 §§ 4, 6 (inserting § 614 to and amending § 325
of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 531).
106. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994).
107. Id.
108. Id.
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semination of information from a multiplicity of sources.' °9 Justice
Breyer concurred that the rules were constitutional, but only on the latter
two grounds."° Hence, according to the four concurring Justices and Jus-
tice Breyer, the government's creation of the "must-carry" rules balanced
opposing rights of users of the cable infrastructure the same way it
forces the users of the electromagnetic spectrum in the broadcasting
analogy to share the airwaves. Justice Breyer, however, was the only one
who saw these as competing speech interests.
The Turner decisions sought to create a compromise between the
two users of the infrastructure-over-the-air broadcasters and cable op-
erators. The need for compromise arises from the fact that the
infrastructure, at least de facto, is a monopoly with limited capacity, and
that mandating certain uses over it necessarily comes at the expense of
other uses, or as the Turner I Court put it: "must-carry" rules "reduce the
number of channels over which cable operators exercise unfettered con-
trol," and "render it more difficult for cable programmers to compete for
carriage on the limited channels remaining."''. This ruling reflects the
prevalent philosophy that only cable operators were deemed to be
"speakers," while the rights of broadcasters remained mostly eco-
nomic. "'
This same mindset is evident in the regulation of cable vertical inte-
gration rules. While a "speech enhancing" rule for independent cable
programmers seems to be more substantiated, it is also based on eco-
nomic considerations. Although the rules themselves are currently
unsettled following their elimination by the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals,"' the law authorizing the FCC to draft them was found
to be constitutional." 4 This law states that the FCC may "prescribe rules
and regulations establishing reasonable limits on the number of channels
on a cable system that can be occupied by a video programmer in which
a cable operator has an attributable interest.""' The court agreed that
109. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner 11), 520 U.S. 180, 189-90 (1997).
110. Id. at 225.
111. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 637.
112. The only case to date advancing the proposition that cable infrastructure is a mo-
nopoly is Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1982).
This could be because it seems axiomatic, or at least it did until 1996, but whether or not the
courts referred to the proposition specifically does not mean it cannot be inferred from their
actions.
113. Time Warner Entm't v. FCC (ime Warner 11), 240 F.3d 1135, 1142-44 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
114. Time Warner Entm't v. FCC (Time Warner 1), 211 E3d 1313, 1322 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
115. 47 U.S.C.A. § 533(f)(1)(B).
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such an imposition on cable operators "is designed to increase the diver-
sity of voices available to the public,"'1 6 and that
[a] cable operator is unlike a newspaper publisher.., in the one
respect crucial to the Congress's reason for enacting the channel
occupancy provision: A newspaper publisher does not have the
ability to exclude competing publications from its subscribers'
homes. The cable operator's bottleneck monopoly is a physical
and economic barrier to such intra-medium competition."7
As a result, the Court established that "[v]ertical integration in the
cable industry ... gives cable operators the incentive and ability to favor
their affiliated programming services. Thus, for example, the cable op-
erator might give its affiliated programmer a more desirable channel
position than another programmer, or even refuse to carry other pro-
grammers""' 8 and it is a legitimate government concern that justifies
limiting cable operators' editorial discretion. This does not amount to
protecting the speech rights of programmers. Rather, it protects their
economic rights from suppression by conflicting corporate interests. The
court's assertion regarding horizontal integration limits to be imposed on
cable operators, that "[t]he Commission is on solid ground in asserting
authority to be sure that no single company could be in a position single-
handedly to deal a programmer a death blow," demonstrates this." 9 Still,
the court later found that both the horizontal and vertical integration ra-
tios set by the Commission were conjectural, at best, and not
substantiated by fact. 20
III. THE ROLE OF THE INTERNET IN THE NETWORK SOCIETY
Similarly to the historical accounts of radio and cable television in
history, the Internet carries immense potential. The Internet serves as the
basis of a "global web of horizontal communication networks that in-
clude the multimodal exchange of interactive messages from many to
many both synchronous and asynchronous,"'12' which can be described
simultaneously as "mass communication," "multimodal," and "self gen-
erated in content, self directed in emission and self selected in
reception."'' 22 As such, the Internet carries the promise of inclusiveness as
116. ime Warnerl, 211F.3d at 1321.
117. Id. at 1321-22.
118. Id. at 1320.
119. ime Warner H, 240 F.3d 1131, 1142-44 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
120. Id. at 1134.
121. Castells, supra note 10, at 246.
122. Id. at 248.
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a mass medium not only received by the many, but also created by the
many.
The Internet was never meant to evolve into what it has become, and
has therefore taken the world by surprise.' What started in the late
1960s as a technology designed to overcome an imminent Soviet nuclear
attack and serve the interests of the military, developed into a proprietary
network serving universities and research institutions, and eventually
into a global network connecting individual computers, large corpora-
tions, and governments over telephone and cable television lines. The
Internet has a "world-wide broadcasting capability" that provides "a
mechanism for information dissemination, and a medium for collabora-
tion and interaction between individuals and their computers without
regard for geographic location.' 24
While garnering very little attention at its inception and for the first
two decades of its existence, the Internet rose in prominence in the 1990s
when the backbone of the network, maintained until then by the National
Science Foundation and serving only research related activities, was pri-
vatized. Its connection to tens of thousands of regional and local
networks, which had developed since the late 1980s and were commer-
cially funded, created a worldwide network. The Internet's emergence as
an instant global network captured the attention of both commercial ac-
tors and governmental institutions. While the former envisioned the
development of multitudes of new services over this network125 and be-
gan devising ways to profit from allowing access to the network, the
latter were considering whether and how policy should respond to the
challenge regarding both the content of the network and the means to
access it. Such regulatory and legal wrangling demonstrates the central
role the Internet plays in educational, civic, and commercial life. This
also emphasizes why its regulation requires a new theoretical perspec-
tive, one that accounts for network access and content.
The most significant steps taken to address these issues were the ini-
tiatives undertaken by the Clinton-Gore Administration soon after the
1992 elections. The newly established National Information Infrastructure
123. WOLFGANG TRUETZCHLER, MEDIA POLICY: CONVERGENCE, CONCENTRATION &
COMMERCE 75 (Denis McQuail & Karen Siune, eds., Sage Publications 1998).
124. Barry M. Leiner et. al, Histories of the Internet, Internet Society, (Dec. 10, 2003),
http://www.isoc.org/intemet/history/brief.shtml.
125. David C. Mowery & Timothy Simcoe, Is the Internet a U.S. Invention?-An Eco-
nomic and Technological History of Computer Networking, 21 (2001), available at http://
www.druld.dk/uploads/tx-picturedb/ds200l-255.pdf ("In 1995, there were a total of 657 infor-
mation technology-related venture capital financings worth $3.3 billion. In 1999, four years later,
there were more than 1,600 deals with a combined valuation in excess of $20 billion.").
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Task Force prepared a report outlining an "Agenda for Action.' 26 The re-
port stipulated that "[a]ll Americans have a stake in the construction of an
advanced National Information Infrastructure.' ' 127 The report outlines the
implications of this universal concern and the need to create policy "in a
technology neutral manner so that no one industry will be favored over
any other."' 28 It further stated that the "value of the National Information
Infrastructure to users and the nation will depend in large parts on the
quality of its other elements,' ' 2' not its physical components, but rather
"the information itself."'3 That information, according to the report,
"means empowerment"13' and, therefore, the government has an obliga-
tion to ensure access for all Americans.
The ensuing Telecommunications Act of 1996132 was "designed to
create a regulatory platform that would permit broad competition among
different kinds of telecommunications service providers.' 3 3 It seemed
more focused, however, on the former Bell companies' desire to control
both the content and conduit of the emerging new technology.3 4 Still, the
breadth of the legislation and its focus on both content and conduit sug-
gests that even in the early stage of Internet development, its central role
in society was already evident to Congress. The Telecommunications Act
of 19961" addressed a few issues related to the Internet, but its most sig-
nificant contribution was blocking access to ("bad") content rather than
encouraging the contribution and access to ("good") content. For exam-
ple, Title V of the proposed act, which included an amendment to section
223 of the Communications Act of 1934, criminalized transmission of
obscene or indecent material targeting minors over the Internet.136 The
Supreme Court found this prohibition to be unconstitutional because it
abridges the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.1
3
1
This set a standard for speaker rights over the Internet, albeit of the inde-
cent kind. With regard to the issue of conduits, the new law was less
126. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRA-
STRUCTURE: AGENDA FOR ACTION (Executive Office of the President 1993).
127. Id. at 1.
128. Id. at 5.
129. Id. at 6.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
133. PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE, COMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST:
THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 8 (Guiford Press 1999).
134. Id. at 37.
135. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
136. Id. § 502, 110 Stat. 56.
137. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997).
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Internet-specific, and some of its more central features, namely the in-
terconnection13 8 and unbundling139 regimes, can be interpreted as focusing
on plain old telephone service. It did, however, introduce one Internet-
specific directive regarding physical access to the network, calling for
the establishment of what is popularly known as the E-rate: subsidized
Internet access to all public and nonprofit elementary and secondary
school classrooms, health care providers, and libraries.' 40 This directive
focused on physical access, an element of the Internet promise that can-
not be overlooked but is beyond the scope of this discussion on network
neutrality. The unique U.S. E-rate policy notwithstanding, some have
argued that a more vigorous pursuit of a national agenda would have
prevented the United States from losing its world leadership position in
broadband penetration and dropping down to twenty-first place.'4 ' This
trend has not gone unnoticed by the political establishment. As late as
the presidential elections of 2004, the incumbent President George W.
Bush promised in his campaign universal broadband access by 2007 .
He emphasized its importance to national infrastructure, a promise also
echoed by his challenger, Senator John F. Kerry of Massachusetts.
43
The importance of access to the Internet cannot and should not be
downplayed. The Internet serves as an alternative to traditional media.
The first major example of its power was the Internet's role in exposing
President William Jefferson Clinton's affair with a White House intern.'"
The Clinton scandal also illustrates how the existence of a new non-
traditional means of reporting can help overcome the inhibitions of the
traditional cozy-with-the-administration press. However, the gossip-
oriented beginnings of the Internet cannot detract from its role as a major
resource for newsgathering. Recent research reports that the number of
Americans who check the Internet for news every day almost doubled
between 2002 and 2004 to 50 million, and that the percentage of Ameri-
cans who went online for election news jumped from thirteen percent in
138. 47 U.S.C.S. § 251(a)(1) (2007).
139. 47 U.S.C.S. § 251(c)(3).
140. 47 U.S.C.S. § 254(h).
141. Richard Hoffman, When It Comes to Broadband, U.S. Plays Follows the Leader, IN-
FORMATION WEEK, (Feb. 15, 2007), http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?
articlelD=197006038.
142. Declan McCullach, Bush: Broadband for the People by 2007, ZDNET, (Apr. 26,
2004), http://news.zdnet.comV2100-3513_22-5200196.html; Scarlet Pruitt, Bush Calls for
Broadband for All by 2007, INFOWORLD, (Mar. 29, 2004), http://www.infoworld.com/article/
04/03/29/HNbushbroadband_ .html.
143. Catherine Yang, Here Comes Broadband John; Kerry is Set to Roll Out an Ambi-
tious Plan to Boost High Tech-and Woo Silicon Valley, BUSINESS WEEK, Apr. 19, 2004, at 84.
144. BILL KOVACH & TOM ROSENTIEL, WARP SPEED: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF MIXED
MEDIA 11-12 (The Century Foundation Press 1999).
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the 2002 election cycle to twenty-nine percent in 2004.14 While many
Internet users use the medium to access their traditional news sources in
electronic format, the Internet has also emerged as a tool for providing
information suppressed by the media establishment through alternative
information services such as Indymedia.
4 6
The Internet's pivotal role in civic communications, however, is not
confined to the access it provides to news and information. The Internet
has also played a significant role in decentralizing the political process
and facilitating the creation of grassroots political movements. One of
the first to see the potential in the Internet was former Vermont Gover-
nor, and 2004 presidential hopeful, Howard Dean. Using the Internet,
Dean was able to raise more funds than his opponents, mostly through
small, online donations.' 47 While Dean was crowned "the Internet candi-
date" back in 2004, "his efforts to campaign online seem primitive"
today.148 The Internet has come to play such a key role in disseminating
information about the political process and in promoting participation in
it that some observers would argue that the rules on focusing advertising,
generating funds, mobilizing popular support, and (unfortunately)
spreading negative information are changing. 149 They cite, for example,
the use of YouTube.com during the 2006 mid-term elections, prompting
one observer to describe this as "the first youtube election."'5° Others
have focused on the future effects of the democratization of the media
and the growing transparency of campaigns, '5' as well as the growing
reliance of politicians on the Internet for campaigning.' The extent of
civic engagement, thanks to the Internet, is not limited to election times
and to Washington politics. As Katz and Rice demonstrate, the Internet
can and has become a tool supporting collective action of the pre-
Internet disenfranchised, allowing them to overcome blocked access to
145. Adam Nagourney, Internet Injects Sweeping Change into U.S. Politics, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 2, 2006, at 1.
146. WIM VAN DE DONK, BRIAN D. LOADER, PAUL G. NIXON & DIETER RUCHT, CYBER-
PROTEST: NEW MEDIA, CITIZENS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 19 (Wim van de Donk, Brian D.
Loader, Paul G. Nixon and Dieter Rucht, eds., Routledge 2004).
147. See Gary Wolf, How the Internet Invented Howard Dean, WIRED, Jan. 2004, http:II
www.wired.com/wired/archive/l 2.01/dean.html.
148. Jose Antonio Vargas & Sam Diaz, Online Firms Boot Up for Political Campaigns,
WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2007, at DOI.
149. Nagourney, supra note 145.
150. The First YouTube Election: George Allen and "Macaca". (Tim Dickinson ed.
2006), ROLLING STONE, Aug. 15, 2006, http://www.rollingstone.com/nationalaffairs/?p=426.
151. Carrie Budoff, Senators Fear Having A "Macaca" Moment: Smallest Slip- Ups Can
Tank A Campaign, Thanks To YouTube, THE POLITICO, Feb. 2, 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2007/02/02/politics/main2425882.shtml.
152. Frank Davies, Candidates find both opportunity, minefield on Web, THE MERCURY
NEWS, Feb. 19, 2007, http://www.siliconvalley.confmild/siliconvalley/16732852.htm (web site
no longer available).
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the corridors of power in order to affect the decisions of local govern-
ment."'53 As Gurak and Logie establish, political and consumer protests
that take advantage of the significant features of the World Wide Web
can be effective,14 even in the face of growing corporate and government
cynicism toward cyberprotest. 5 Political activism is only one side of
civic participation. No less important is the role of education, and there
is "decisive evidence that technology use can lead to positive effects on
student achievement."'
56
Not all have seen the potential of the Internet in such a positive light.
Studies of its early days in both Washington' 7 and Amsterdam'58 point to
the fact that, at least initially, some of the "democratizing" initiatives
undertaken by national or local governments were little more than top-
down communications controlled by those who already held the reigns
of power. Contemporary analyses of the democratizing powers of the
Internet have not necessarily become more optimistic. Downey, for ex-
ample, finds that "the democratic optimism surrounding the Internet
should not blind us to the realities of the political economy of the me-
dia.'"5 9 Giacomello observes that national governments wish to control
the Internet as an integral part of their national security policies. '6 Vegh
points out the universality of undemocratic practices vis- -vis the Inter-
net, whether driven by political or by commercial motivations. 6
However, as Friedland observed as far back as the mid-1 990s, while the
analysis of emerging social networks based on the Internet may be chal-
lenged by a critique of their contribution to a deliberative democracy,
153. JAMES E. KATZ & RONALD E. RICE, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNET USE:
ACCESS, INVOLVEMENT, AND INTERACTION 127 (MIT Press 2002).
154. Laura J. Gurak & John Logie, Internet Protests, from Text to Web, in CYBERACTIV-
ISM: ONLINE ACTIVISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 25 (Martha McCaughey & Michael D.
Ayers, eds., Routledge 2003).
155. Id. at 26.
156. Testimony and Statement for the Record of Margaret Honey before the Labor HHS,
and Education Appropriations S. Subcomm. (2001) (statement of Margaret Honey, Vice Presi-
dent of Education Development Center), available at http://main.edc.org/newsroom/features/
mhtestimony.asp#1.
157. Kenneth L. Hacker, Missing Links in the Evolution of Electronic Democratization,
18 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOCIETY 213, 219 (1996).
158. Kees Brants, Martine Huizenga, Reineke van Meerten, The New Canals of Amster-
dam: An Exercise in Local Electronic Democracy, 18 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOCIETY 233, 235
(1996).
159. John Downey, Surveillance from Below: The Internet and the Intifada, in IDEOLO-
GIES OF THE INTERNET 158 (K. Sarikakis, D. Thussu, eds., Hampton Press 2006).
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INTERNET: A DIGITAL CHALLENGE 5 (Routledge 2005).
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Potentials of the Internet, in IDEOLOGIES OF THE INTERNET 63 (K. Sarikakis, D. Thussu, eds.,
Hampton Press 2006).
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their enabling function for the establishment of new forms of citizen in-
teraction and relationships should not be overlooked.
62
The benefits the Internet offers are by no means trivial. For the indi-
vidual, the Internet offers: the acquisition of alternative information and
viewpoints, a center for civic participation, and a network for expression
and participation in the marketplace. The question of Internet access is a
question of both "physical" and "content" access, and the ability to ac-
cess and contribute to the network. Merely because explosive growth of
the Internet in the 1990s in the United States has been a response to
market demands, does not and cannot mean that future growth of the
Internet should be unfettered. Indeed, a free market does not mean a
chaotic market in which power determines prominence and dominance.
Rather, the Internet requires rules that will allow it to realize its poten-
tial, as well as a theory to guide them. The rules chosen thus far,
however, have achieved the opposite.
IV. LEGACY REGULATION AND ITS THREAT TO
NETWORK NEUTRALITY
The passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 marked a new
era for broadcasters, cable operators, and common carriers because it
allowed them to provide new services unavailable under the "old order."
Broadcasters were given additional spectrum over which they were al-
lowed to provide more channels, cable operators were allowed to provide
telephone services, and local operators were allowed to provide video
services. But most importantly, the Act marked the advent of the Internet
and created the regulatory framework for its introduction. As Ithiel de
Sola Pool observed,163 policymakers more often than not regulate new
technologies based on analogies with technologies of the past. As our
discussion has so far demonstrated, several possible policy narratives can
explain Internet regulation, none of which are promising.
A. Applying First Amendment Theory to Net Neutrality:
The Problems of the Bi-Modal Approach
The utilitarian interpretation of the First Amendment sees govern-
ment as the only threat from which the speaker needs protection. The
silencing of individuals that emerges from governmental preference for a
defined group of speakers is justified because it promotes the common
good. It is an "outgrowth of the dissension of the European settlers who
162. Lewis A. Friedland, Electronic Democracy and the New Citizenship, 18 MEDIA,
CULTURE & SOCIETY 185, 189 (1996).
163. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 12, at 7.
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populated North America-men and women seeking to escape from so-
cial rigidities, to exercise a larger measure of economic freedom, to form
governments and government structures that they might control rather
than the other way around." '6' The resulting narrow perception of the
First Amendment is based on the notion that government power is the
main threat to free expression' 65 and that two parties, and only two par-
ties, are relevant-the speaker-dissenter who wishes to speak, and a
government that wishes, for whatever reason, to silence her.'66 The
Turner decisions illustrate this point well. In classifying the must-carry
rules as content-neutral, Justice Kennedy noted that the "privileges" con-
ferred by the must-carry provisions are unrelated to content, and that the
rules "benefit" all broadcasters who request carriage.' The Court does
not characterize broadcasters as possessing an independent free speech
interest. Rather, broadcasters are entities that are "privileged" and "bene-
fited" by the must-carry provisions, as if these provisions were mere
windfall. As a result, broadcasters do not play any role in the balancing
process that the intermediate standard dictates, except for a "representa-
tion" by proxy in the governmental interests asserted to justify the must-
carry provisions. Similarly, the individual cable subscribers are only
mentioned in the context of the bottleneck problem for the purpose of
differentiating Turner from the Tornillo precedent, 161 in which the
Supreme Court protected newspapers from a speech enhancement re-
quirement. When weighing the competing free speech interests of one
against the other, the equation drawn by the Court contains only two
variables: the cable operators (and the cable programmers' merging in-
terests), and the government. This bi-modal construction of the First
Amendment might result in the limitation of speech-enhancing regula-
tion, no matter how praiseworthy.
When confronted with the complexity of the Internet arising from its
evolution into a multilateral speech environment, the Supreme Court has
taken two basic, yet different, routes for addressing the discrepancy be-
tween the bilateral legal conceptualities and the multilateral developing
realities. The first has abandoned existing categories and standards in
164. ROLAND S. HOMET JR., POLITICS, CULTURES, AND COMMUNICATION: EUROPEAN
VS. AMERICAN APPROACHES TO COMMUNICATIONS POL1CYMAKING 4 (Aspen Institute for Hu-
manistic Studies 1979).
165. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 737-38
(1996) (suggesting no First Amendment implications in government regulations permitting
broadcasters to censor their own programming); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512
U.S. 622, 685 (1994) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
166. See Angela J. Campbell, Publish or Carriage: Approaches to Analyzing the First
Amendment Rights of Telephone Companies, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1116 (1992).
167. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 644.
168. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
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favor of a case-by-case balancing of interests, as illustrated in its ruling
in Denver Area. 69 The second has reduced the multilateral setting into a
bilateral one through one of the following two mechanisms: (1) a sec-
ond-level reduction of First Amendment rights-usually the rights of
those who "gain" from the government regulation-into a component of
the governmental interests; 7° or, (2) treatment of private entities as quasi-
public, based on their characteristics and/or the nature of their activities.
In Turner, the Court used the first mechanism, second-level reduction, to
simplify the First Amendment dilemma by transforming specific indi-
vidual First Amendment rights into a component of abstract
governmental interests, which are inherently inferior to the individual
rights on the opposite sides of the equation. The second mechanism in-
volves identifying governmental characteristics in private entities or
"state action" in their activities, such as monopoly status, the exercise of
quasi-public functions, or subjection to licensing requirements or gov-
ernment regulation. 7 ' The basic flaw in each of these approaches in the
context of the Internet is that they both retreat to the familiar bilateral
government-speaker equation, which is completely incompatible with
the realities of a multiple-speaker environment and which can generate
multilateral speech conflicts.
7 2
Scholars have traced the understanding of the First Amendment in
broad, positive terms, for the sake of enhancing democratic deliberation,
to the work of James Madison 73 and Thomas Jefferson. 7 4 In modern le-
gal history, the notion that government may take action in order to
enhance speech and realize First Amendment objectives (as opposed to
the utilitarian "marketplace" metaphor formulated by Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes in his famous Abrams dissent) 75 can be traced to the
work of Alexander Meikeljohn'76 and Justice Black's widely cited pas-
sage in Associated Press v. United States.
17 7
169. DenverArea, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
170. See Campbell, supra note 166, at 1116.
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CASE AGAINST MEDIA CONSOLIDATION 39 (Mark N. Cooper ed., McGannon Center for
Communication Policy, Fordham University 2007).
175. Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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B. The Common Carrier Regulation Legacy
The major challenge regulators had to address with regard to the new
framework created by the law was the introduction of competition to
markets that had been characterized, perceived, and regulated as natural
monopolies for decades. Constrained by the technological bias inherent
in the Communications Act, which dictated different foundations for ex-
isting regulations, Congress did not attempt to create a unified and
technologically neutral policy, as was the case in Europe,77 but rather
clung to existing classifications. Consequently, even though local phone
companies were now allowed to provide multi-channel television ser-
vices and cable companies were allowed to provide voice-telephony, and
both were allowed to provide Internet access, each operator was to ex-
pect specific regulations based on its legacy. Inevitably, this
technologically constrained reality led to the development of conflicting
solutions, which, nonetheless, preserved the utilitarian structure from
which they emerged.
One policy thread limited by the Act's technological bias was the in-
troduction of the dichotomous relationship between "information
services" and "telecommunication services." As noted above, this dis-
tinction was created to deregulate data applications over telephone lines.
The first major challenge to these definitions came when the city of Port-
land, Oregon, conditioned the transfer of a cable franchise on a cable
operator's granting unrestricted access to its cable broadband facilities to
all competing Internet Service Providers (ISPs). The district court upheld
this decision 79 on the grounds that the local franchising authority can
regulate "cable services" in order to preserve competition.'" The district
court also cited the authority's use of the "essential facility" doctrine, a
doctrine developed to ensure that non-duplicatable facilities deemed
necessary for the provision of a service are shared between their owners
[The First] Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemina-
tion of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare
of the public, that a free press is a condition of a free society. Surely a command
that the government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford
non-governmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon that consti-
tutionally guaranteed freedom.... Freedom of the press from governmental
interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that free-
dom by private interests.
Associated Press v. U.S., 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
178. J. Scott Marcus, The Potential Relevance to the United States of the European Un-
ion's Newly Adopted Regulatory Framework for Telecommunications 12-13 (FCC Office of
Plans and Policy, Working Paper No. 36, 2002), available at http://esnie.u-parisl0.fr/pdf/
textes-2004/WilkieMarcus.pdf.
179. AT&T v. City of Portland, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1156 (D. Or. 1999).
180. Id. at 1152.
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and their competitors,'8 ' an economic-technological rationale. The court
of appeals, however, reversed this decision,12 finding that "transmission
of Internet service to subscribers over cable broadband facilities is a
telecommunications service under the Communications Act" 83 and
therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the local franchising authority. Both
the substantial issue at stake and the need to ensure the provision of an
essential service under conditions of competition failed to guide the de-
cision. Rather, a jurisdictional dispute informed by technological (and
one could argue, irrelevant) issues grounded the decision. This ruling,
however, gave rise to a series of regulatory determinations and chal-
lenges.
As described above, "telecommunication services" were the Tele-
communication Act's 1996 heirs to the "computer inquiries'"
classification of "basic services," which were to be regulated as "com-
mon carriers" under Title II of the Communications Act.' The City of
Portland decision could have subjected cable operators who provided
Internet access to the provisions of new section 251 of the Act,'85 which
includes requirements to interconnect to all other providers of telecom-
munication services8 6 and contribute to the Universal Service Fund.'87
Following this unforeseen development, the FCC published a declaratory
ruling that established broadband access to the Internet over cable facili-
ties should be seen as an interstate information service, ' and therefore,
not subject to Title II regulation. This ruling was challenged successfully
in court,'89 leading the Supreme Court to reverse this position and estab-
lish that cable modem access to the Internet is indeed an information
service. '9° Thus, a scarce resource, physical access to the Internet, was
declared "unregulated," marking a historical turn in telecommunication
regulatory policy. For the first time, a physical element of the network,
undoubtedly scarce, was deemed unregulated. The Court did note, in
dicta, that the FCC "remains free to impose special regulatory duties on
facilities-based ISPs under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction."' 9' However,
181. Id. at 1150.
182. AT&T v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 880 (9th Cir. 2000).
183. Id.
184. 47 U.S.C.S. § 153 (2007).
185. 47 U.S.C.S. § 251 (2007).
186. 47 U.S.C.S. § 251(a).
187. 47 U.S.C.S. § 254(b)(4).
188. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facili-
ties, Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4802 (2002).
189. Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003).
190. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 999-
1003 (2005).
191. Id. at 996.
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the FCC chose not to pursue a regulatory path, but rather to deregulate
Internet access over DSL technology as well.
This followed another legal scuffle over the interpretation of a
mechanism for overcoming initial barriers to entry of competitive local
exchange carriers, introduced in the 1996 Act. 92 This mechanism, the
"unbundling" regime, was also a remnant of the "computer inquiries,'"'93
and, just like the "computer inquiries," it offered an economic solution to
a challenge posed by scarcity. The FCC was required to develop a list of
unbundled network elements (UNE) within six months of the Act's pas-
sage. 94 Instead, within ten years, the unbundling requirement, despite
being found constitutional, was emptied of any substance' 9 as the FCC
specifically deregulated broadband services. At first, in its 2003 Trien-
nial Review Order,'96 the FCC decided not to require incumbents to
unbundle their fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) local loops in places where the
fiber loop had not previously existed. In places where they had existed,
unbundling was required only if the incumbent had retired its copper
infrastructure, but even then only for the provision of "narrowband" ser-
vices. 197 The court approved this policy'98 because it foresaw the
elimination of "physical" scarcity through "intermodal" competition in-
volving deregulated cable and common-carrier facilities.' 99 The court
believed competition among facilities eliminates "physical scarcity."
By the time the court published the Earthlink decision in the summer
of 2006, the FCC had further deregulated broadband access to the Inter-
net. In applying the aforementioned Brand X decision, it adopted the
Wireline Facilities Order, under which DSL access to the Internet should
also be defined as an "information service.,,200 This dramatic turn of
events deregulated telephone companies' broadband services and put
them on par with cable operators' because now neither were obligated to
provide their ISP competitors with access to their lines,20' either for fiber
192. 47 U.S.C.S. § 251(c)(3) (2007).
193. Cybertelecom.org, Unbundled Network Elements, http://www.cybertelecom.org/
notes/une.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2007).
194. 47 U.S.C.S. § 25 1(d).
195. For a detailed description of the gradual erosion of the unbundling regime in the
U.S., see Rob Frieden, Unbundling the Local Loop: A Cost/Benefit Analysis for Developing
Nations, 7 INFO: J. POL'Y, REG. AND STRATEGY FOR TELECOMM. 3, 6-10 (2005).
196. Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers, 18 F.C.C.R. 16978 (2003).
197. Id. at 17142.
198. Earthlink, Inc. v. FCC, 462 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
199. Id. at 5.
200. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facili-
ties, Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, 14862-65 (2005).
201. Ted Glazner, Unpacking the Brand X Decision, TMCNET, June 27, 2005, http://
www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2005/junl 158573.htm.
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technology, or for the legacy copper network. In a two-front assault, the
FCC shed its generation-long utilitarian reasoning by eliminating the
unbundling regime and defining all broadband access to the Internet as
"information services." This left the Internet access playing field open to
only two viable competitors, 02 as if no "physical scarcity" existed any-
more. Hence, in the face of the challenges created by the Act, both the
FCC and the courts combined to create a technological duopoly based on
legacy networks,0 3 and currently both networks enjoy the same defense
from regulation and a reluctant-to-regulate FCC.204 The upshot is that
legacy owners of the infrastructure can now discriminate among their
users while acting "under the radar" of regulatory authorities.
C. The Turner Legacy
The incorporation of the utilitarian approach into the regulation of
"information services" and the threat it imposes on network neutrality is
further accentuated by the legacy of the Turner decisions. If neutrality
rules were enacted and were perceived as limiting Broadband Service
Providers (BSPs) from exercising control over their privately owned
network, they could be seen as a version of "must-carry" (albeit with a
much lesser problem of channel scarcity). The governmental interests
202. Cable and DSL providers currently control almost ninety-eight percent of the resi-
dential and small-business broadband market and more than one quarter of consumers have
only one choice between cable and DSL. Even in markets with both services available, cus-
tomers usually face a duopoly, with one choice for each type of service. See S. Derek Turner,
Broadband Reality Check: The FCC Ignores America's Digital Divide, 3 (2005), http://
www.freepress.net/docs/broadband-report.pdf.
203. This policy choice should be seen in an international comparative context as well,
in particular with regard to the policy choices made by the European Union and its member
states. This includes a pan-European unbundling policy, see Council Regulation 2887/2000,
On Unbundled Access To The Local Loop, 2000 O.J. (L 336) 6, 7 (EC). At least Holland,
which enjoys the second highest broadband penetration level in the world, OECD Broadband
Statistics to June 2006, www.oedg.org (enter "Broadband Statistics to June 2006" under
"Search" at top of page, follow "OECD Broadband Statistics to June 2006" hyperlink) (last
visited November 15, 2006), has passed a law that requires even cable companies to unbundle
their local loops, see http://www.jupiterresearch.con/bin/item.pl/research:vision/1243/
id=98485 (last visited March 16, 2007) (website no longer available).
204. See Chairman Martin's statement following the AT&T BellSouth merger in De-
cember 2006:
The conditions regarding net-neutrality have very little to do with the merger at
hand and very well may cause greater problems than the speculative problems they
seek to address. These conditions are simply not warranted by current market con-
ditions and may deter facilities investment. Accordingly, it gives us pause to
approve last-minute remedies to address the ill-defined problem net neutrality pro-
ponents seek to resolve.
AT&T Inc., FCC 06-189, (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n Dec. 29, 2006) (Joint Statement by
Chairman Martin and Commissioner Tate).
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that could justify network neutrality rules are almost identical to the in-
terests recognized by the Court in Turner as substantial governmental
interests. Both cases involve "technological-physical" scarcity, and both
present a complex set of conflicting First Amendment rights and inter-
ests. Thus, the threat to network neutrality that arises from this
development is rooted mostly, though not exclusively, in the challenges
raised by the Court's Turner decisions. The circumstances of Turner lead
us to conclude that the Turner decisions (which one would assume could
support a neutral network provision, just as they upheld "must-carry")
jeopardize network neutrality for the following reasons.
First, BSPs, like cable operators, can be reasonably characterized
both as conduits and as editors,05 even if their activities are not identical
to those of cable television operators, and even if over the Internet users
generally have more control over their own content.2 6 Given the antici-
pated development of IP Television, the nature of network neutrality will
more closely match the circumstances of Turner. Thus, BSPs have at
least the potential to exercise editorial discretion.0 7 As net neutrality
proponents, we are the first to acknowledge that BSPs, and their activi-
ties as such, might enjoy at least some degree of First Amendment
protection, as "every sort of network proprietor to try this line of argu-
ment has succeeded. 2 8
Second, Justice Kennedy, writing for his three colleagues in the plu-
rality in Turner, stated that even if government interests are sufficiently
important in the abstract, that does not mean that the must-carry rules
will in fact advance those interests, since the government "must demon-
strate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the
regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material
way.' '201 Indeed, Justice Kennedy agreed that courts must accord substan-
tial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress. Nevertheless he
added that the Court's obligation is to assure that, "in formulating its
205. Frederick Schauer, Cable Operators as Editors: Prerogative, Responsibility, and
Liability, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 161, 175 (1994).
206. See Ex parte letter from Tim Wu, Associate Professor, University of Virginia, and
Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary,
Federal Trade Commission (Aug. 22, 2003) (http://faculty.virginia.edu/timwu/wu-lessig_
fcc.pdf); Bill D. Herman, Opening Bottlenecks: On Behalf of Mandated Network Neutrality,
59 FED. COMM. L.J. 107, 118 (2006).
207. In fact, wireless broadband service providers, for example, have been very clear
about having an editorial agenda. See Tim Wu, Wireless Net Neutrality: Cellular Carterfone
and Consumer Choice in Mobile Broadband 12-14 (New Am. Found. Wireless Future Pro-
gram, Working Paper No. 17, 2007), available at http://www.newamerica.net/files/
WorkingPaper 17/_WirelessNetNeutrality_.Wu.pdf.
208. Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy and Free Speech: The First Amendment at War
With Itself, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1211, 1221 (2007).
209. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner 1), supra note 106, at 664.
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judgments, Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial
evidence, 21 ° which he felt were not made, even though the must-carry
rules were enacted "after conducting three years of hearings on the struc-
ture and operation of the cable television industry. 2 ' However, only
after further factual findings were made by the lower court and not by
Congress, was the Turner II Court willing to uphold the must-carry
rules. The "substantial evidence" requirement imposed by intermediate
scrutiny, or "intermediate plus" scrutiny,1 2 poses a real problem for net-
work neutrality rules because the discussion surrounding this issue is
mostly forward-looking, and thus "the core claims of proponents and
opponents of net neutrality are difficult to test systematically against his-
torical empirical evidence."2 '3 In the case of network neutrality, examples
of discrimination performed by BSPs 2 4 are mostly anecdotal. At this
stage, a clear and compelling body of empirical evidence that BSPs are
unfairly blocking access to Web sites or online services is lacking, "
even though BSP motivation to do so seems apparent."'
There is, however, at least one important difference between Turner
and the network neutrality situation in the present context. Internet tech-
nology uses "packet-switching," and therefore does not suffer from the
problem of "content scarcity." Neutrality rules would not impair the
BSPs' ability to carry any content they wish to carry or require a BSP to
carry any user or content provider at the expense of another. Paradoxi-
cally, the fact that their freedom of expression is not jeopardized further
protects cable and telephone operators from regulation designed to pre-
vent them from abusing their dominant position. While the absence of
"content scarcity" on the Internet has led at least one commentator to
argue that an "open access regime" should require only rational basis,
and not intermediate scrutiny, to support its constitutionality,"7 the ab-
sence of scarcity has traditionally served as a reason for the Supreme
210. Id. at 666.
211. Id. at 632; see also Goodman, supra note 208, at 1220 ("[Congress] held more than
a dozen hearings, accumulated a legislative record of more than 30,000 pages, and made de-
tailed findings based on a decade's experience with intermittent must-carry rules.").
212. Goodman, supra note 208, at 1219.
213. Johannes M. Bauer, Professor, Dept. Telecomm., Info. Studies, and Media, Mich.
St. Univ., Dynamic Effects of Network Neutrality, paper presented at the 35th Conference on
Communication, Information and Internet Policy (Sept. 29-Oct. 1 2006), available at
http://www.msu.edu/-bauerj/papers/bauer-tprc-2006.pdf, at 2.
214. See Wu, supra note 8; Herman, supra note 206.
215. See Adam T. Thierer, "Net Neutrality "-Digital Discrimination or Regulatory
Gamesmanship in Cyberspace? 507 PoLicY ANALYSIS 1 (2004), available at http://www.cdt.
org/speech/net-neutrality/20040112thierer.pdf.
216. See Ante & Crockett, supra note 2.
217. See Harold Feld, Whose Line is it Anyway? The First Amendment and Cable Open
Access, 8 CoMMiLAw CONSPECTUS 23, 32-34 (2000).
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Court to apply a higher level of scrutiny, not a lower one. In fact, the
Turner I Court used the same reasoning to differentiate between broad-
cast and cable."8 Thus, it could be argued not only that rational basis is
the improper standard to apply to network neutrality rules, but also that
the resulting standard would paradoxically be strict scrutiny.2"9
Indeed, the threat to freedom of expression from this is probably its
most significant feature because the service ISPs provide was defined as
a "content" service. The courts had no problem in allowing those in con-
trol of the "physical" and essential access routes for this content to
dominate them. This can be seen as yet another weakness of the First
Amendment doctrine developed in the "utilitarian age of regulation" and
further proof of the dire need for a new underlying theory for telecom-
munications regulation.
V. THE "DISTRIBUTIVE NETWORK": A THEORY OF JUSTICE FOR THE
REGULATION OF ACCESS TO THE INTERNET
The theory of distributive justice has only made its first steps in serv-
ing as the basis for a theory of communication policy. Drale22° equated it
with the assumption that "equal access to the means of self-
determination is a fundamental human right.""2 ' She identified distribu-
tive justice's main concern with a democratic process free of coercion,222
but deemed it impractical in its pure form. 23 It implied, she said, that the
media were both the loci of democratic procedures and their eventual out-
come,224 and therefore it suggests and condones policies such as unfettered
218. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner 1), supra note 106, at 640-41.
219. This exact line of thought led the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida in Comcast Cablevision of Broward County v. Broward County, Florida,
124 F. Supp. 2d 685 (S.D. Fla. 2000), to strike down a county ordinance that required cable
operators who offered broadband Internet services to allow competitor ISPs equal access to
their system. The district court found that the Florida cable operators did not exercise a bottle-
neck monopoly over access to the Internet the way they do in the cable television market. Id.
at 697-98. Thus, the district court applied the strict scrutiny test developed in Miami Herald
Pub'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), even though the court said that the ordinance
would not survive even intermediate scrutiny, found that the ordinance abridged freedom of
speech and the press by depriving cable operators of editorial discretion, infringed upon their
liberty of circulation, and singled them out from all other speakers. Comcast, 124 F Supp. 2d
at 694-98. Comcast has been criticized for its departure from Turner I's intermediate test. See
David Wolitz, Open Access and the First Amendment: A Critique of Comcast Cablevision of
Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 4 YALE SYMP. L. & TECH. 6,48-49 (2001).
220. Christina S. Drale, Communication Media in a Democratic Society, 9 COMM. L. &
POL'y 213, 216 (2004).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 219.
223. Id. at 226.
224. Id. at 223.
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Internet access and others aimed at maximizing the active participation
of ordinary citizens."5 Chin identifies Rawls's theory with a positive
construction of speech entitlements,226 while Heyman sees distributive
justice as the framework for determining what equality means in the con-
text of state-supporting speech policies. 7 Others, however, find
distributive justice in general and its Rawlsian interpretation in particular
as either inadequate to serve as a basis for the discussion of communica-
tion policy or even detrimental to free speech. Thus, Collins finds that
Rawlsian arguments fail to fully take into account the impact of network
externalities, and therefore, may lead to sub-optimal results when ap-
plied to policies seeking equity and universal service. In particular, he
claims that the Rawlsian model is "undynamic',228 in that it does not con-
sider adequately the problem of resource creation.229 Redish and Klaudis
argue that a right of access created under the guise of distributive justice
has merely a redistributive effect affecting privately owned economic
230resources.
We contend, however, as Redish and Klaudis suggest, that the Inter-
net, perhaps more than any other technological medium of the past,
lends itself to analysis as a technology that can provide for free expres-
sion to a maximum number of individuals.2 3 ' As Balkin asserts, "The
digital revolution makes possible widespread cultural participation and
interaction that previously could not have existed on the same scale,
232
and creates the opportunity for a democratic culture "in which individu-
als have a fair opportunity to participate in the forms of meaning making
that constitute them as individuals.
'233
As such, the Internet should not be seen as a technology in which the
maximum social good is achieved through exclusive rights awarded to a
select few (the model developed for the technologies of scarcity), but
rather it is the relevant technology to which to apply the theory of jus-
tice. While the scarcity rationale may have justified a utilitarian model of
225. Id. at 223-24.
226. Andrew Chin, Making the World Wide Web Safe for Democracy: A Medium-Specific
First Amendment Analysis, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 309, 317 n.29 (1997).
227. Steven J. Heyman, State-Supported Speech, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 1119, 1145 (1999).
228. Richard Collins, From Monopolies, Virtual Monopolies and Oligopolies to... What?
Media Policy and Convergence in South Africa and the United Kingdom, 5 S. AFR. J. INFO. &
COMM. 23, 33-35 (2004), available at http://Iink.wits.ac.za/journal/j05-collins-convergence.pdf.
229. Id. at 33.
230. Martin H. Redish & Kirk J. Klaudis, The Right of Expressive Access in First
Amendment Theory: Redistributive Values and the Democratic Dilemma, 93 Nw. U. L. REV.
1083, 1085 (1999).
231. Id. at 1134.
232. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004).
233. Id.
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justice, the lack of scarcity that characterizes the Internet mandates a
regulatory theory that offers a "correcting" rule by invoking the maximin
principle.
Rawls's theory of justice is relevant primarily because, as Rawls ac-
knowledges, it is a political theory. It does not purport to dictate a moral
position, but rather a practical resolution to a dispute, based on an
agreement of fairness.2 ' The Rawlsian theory is aimed at social actors as
a normative and political theory.235 It is the unique position of the Inter-
net, and in particular the potential of broadband access, that renders it a
forum that enables the participation of all, and not a closed community
in which rules of seniority, aristocracy, and exclusivity may apply. Con-
sequently, it creates the need for rules that negate all forms of tyranny
and oppression, whether initiated by government or by dominance
through wealth. Unfortunately, many observers are intrigued by the no-
tion that the "network neutrality" controversy reflects a battle among the
236wealthy. As our discussion of the Internet and its unique social role
demonstrates, however, the "network neutrality" debate is playing out
despite the wealthy. Indeed, large content providers, for whom the Inter-
net is a source of income, would be damaged should access providers be
allowed to discriminate. How and whether they will continue to provide
services over the Internet, however, will be determined by economic
considerations. The promise of the Internet does not lie in its support of
large businesses, but in the opportunities it provides for those who could
not have had a say in technologies of content scarcity. Bearing in mind
the maximin rule's basic tenet that whatever the policy chosen, its first
goal should be to improve the situation of the least advantaged, the the-
ory of distributive justice becomes the most appropriate framework for
an underlying theory of regulation of Internet access. Over the Internet,
everyone is potentially a speaker. The theory of justice is designed first
and foremost to help realize that potential.
The second element of the theory of justice that renders it appropriate
is its establishment of basic rights for all prior to the discussion of the
rules by which market forces will dictate policy. Indeed, as noted, current
First Amendment theory is fixed on a bi-modal understanding of speech
rights, correcting speech suppression by corporate control only when it
involves economic interests. The abundance of space over the Internet
provides for a multi-modal analysis of the control of speech over its chan-
nels and the recognition that corporate silencing of voices can be avoided
234. RAWLS, Collected Papers, supra note 11, at 390.
235. RAWLS, Restatement, supra note 11, at 20.
236. Kennard, supra note 4, at A3.
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without challenging corporate speech because the wealth of space over the
Internet fails to dictate utilitarian solutions based on a scarcity theory.
In this context, it is important to note that "network neutrality" is not
about regulation of the Internet, but the opposite. Network neutrality is
about ensuring that physical scarcity in access to the Internet, resulting
from Brand X237 and the Wireline Facilities order,238 does not limit the
abundance of content over the Internet. Indeed, network neutrality regu-
lation may have been deemed superfluous had there not been access
scarcity. The need to regulate content diversity in light of physical scar-
city has been recognized as constitutional in Turner,239 Time Warner ,
and even by default in the elimination of the fairness doctrine in Syra-241
cuse. What makes the introduction of the theory of justice through the
acknowledged lack of scarcity a novel concept is the adherence to the
promise of basic rights to all as a preliminary requirement before any
other policy discussion. No such requirement exists in scarcity-induced
utilitarian discourse.
The theory of justice, however, does not end by recognizing the need
to guarantee basic rights. It is also about a need to "redress past harms,"
a legitimate goal recognized by the courts,242 and a feature of distributive
justice which distinguishes it from utilitarianism. Indeed, rectifying in-
justice as advocated by Rawls is mostly a utopian-theoretical construct.
The "original position" is not possible because, in practical terms, people
cannot be expected to forgo the rights they have acquired in property.
However, even if acting under a hypothetical "veil of ignorance" can
genuinely lead to a conclusion that provision of cable services under
conditions of both physical and content scarcity generates a free speech
right for operators, this right is not intuitively transferred to the provision
of broadband services for at least two reasons. First, when cable opera-
tors (or local phone companies) acquired their initial license, they could
not have expected to enjoy control of Internet content as well. Because
this control is a kind of windfall, cable and local phone operators should
not be allowed to control it or have an advantage in its control over the
rest of society. Second, in the absence of scarcity, the right to discrimi-
237. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2006).
238. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facili-
ties, 20 EC.C.R. 14853 (2005).
239. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994); Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 11), 520 U.S. 180, 189-90 (1997).
240. Time Warner Entm't v. FCC (Time Warner 1), 211 F.3d 1313, 1322 (D.C. Cir.
2000); Time Warner Entm't v. FCC (Time Warner 11), 240 F.3d 1135, 1142-44 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
241. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 665 (D.C Cir. 1989).
242. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 664.
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nate, either to protect one's own speech or economic interests, cannot
emerge without justification.
The theory of justice is not bereft of a moral compass. After the rules
are determined and market conditions are restored, the theory of justice
accepts that those that find themselves in positions of wealth may have
also bettered their position. Prior to this stage, the lot of the least advan-
taged needs to be improved. In light of the regulation under assumptions
of scarcity, and assuming opportunity for expression is agreed by all as
the most basic of individual rights, the reality of abundance calls for a
network in which no one misses an opportunity to speak. While the
"wealthy" will always find a way to express themselves, the broadband
Internet provides this opportunity to the least advantaged. Here again,
the theory of justice provides a fair and just guideline.
A major concern for network neutrality proponents has been pre-
serving the role of the Internet as the purveyor of twenty-first century
innovation.23 Egalitarian access to the Internet to participate in the eco-
nomic opportunities it offers, will be maintained under a system that
ensures neutrality. Additionally, the obligation to preserve freedom of
speech to all is maintained. While access is a necessary condition, it is
far from a sufficient one. Ensuring physical access to broadband Internet
and enabling individual use, are critical in making network neutrality a
worthy endeavor.
CONCLUSION
Framing communication policy through a prism of scarcity is no
longer relevant in the age of broadband Internet. The utilitarian solutions
by which the masses were silenced for the sake of the public good have
become, at least with regard to the Internet's content, obsolete. The the-
ory of distributive justice helps to re-establish freedom of expression as
our first freedom, and has, for the first time, made this potentially
achievable. It also helps us justify the rectification of past wrongs, or at
least, of the unintended consequences of privilege awarded under the
pretense of scarcity.
Network neutrality is about creating a potential voice for the many
over the first true technology of abundance: broadband Internet. While
acknowledging the inadequacy of existing jurisprudence to support a
network neutrality policy, we have the obligation to seek and pursue in-
novative ways to develop a more just distribution of power over this
243. See Wu, supra note 8.
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twenty-first century medium of mass communication, as well as to seek
and pursue (a theory of) justice and justice alone.
